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Abstract
We present a general, consistency-based framework for
belief change. Informally, in revising K by α, we begin
with α and incorporate as much of K as consistently
possible. Formally, a knowledge base K and sentence
α are expressed, via renaming propositions in K, in
separate alphabets, but such that there is an isomor-
phism between the original and new alphabets. Using
a maximization process, we assume that correspond-
ing atoms in each language are equivalent insofar as
is consistently possible. Lastly, we express the resul-
tant knowledge base using just the original alphabet.
There may be more than one way in which α can be
so extended by K: in choice revision, one such “exten-
sion” represents the revised state; alternately revision
consists of the intersection of all such extensions.
The overall framework is flexible enough to express
other approaches to revision and update, and the in-
corporation of static and dynamic integrity constraints.
Our framework differs from work based on ordinal con-
ditional functions, notably with respect to iterated re-
vision. We argue that the approach is well-suited for
implementation: choice revision gives better complex-
ity results than general revision; the approach can be
expressed in terms of a finite knowledge base; and the
scope of a revision can be restricted to just those propo-
sitions mentioned in the sentence for revision α.
Introduction
We describe a general framework for belief change. The
approach has something of the same flavour as the
consistency-based paradigm for diagnosis (Reiter 1987)
or the assumption-based approach to default reasoning
(Poole 1988), although it differs significantly in details.
Informally, in revising a knowledge base K by sentence
α, we begin with α and incorporate as much of K as
consistently possible. There may be more than one way
in which information from K can be incorporated. This
gives rise to two notions of revision: a choice notion, in
which one such “extension” is used for the revised state,
and the intersection of all such extensions. Belief con-
traction is defined analogously.
We mainly focus on belief revision in this paper. For
revision, first a knowledge base K and sentence α are
expressed, via renaming atomic propositions in K, in
separate alphabets. We next assume that as many
atoms in α are equivalent to the corresponding atom
in K, as consistently possible. A set of such equivalent
atoms is used to incorporate as much of the original
knowledge base as is consistently possible. In the final
section we discuss the more general approach, which we
show is flexible enough to express extant approaches to
revision and update.
The approach is developed in a formal, abstract
framework. However, we argue that it is well-suited
for implementation: The notion of choice revision gives
better complexity results than general revision; more-
over, we argue that belief revision is an area in which
choice reasoning makes sense in some cases. Second,
we show how the approach can be expressed equiva-
lently in terms of a finite knowledge base, in place of a
deductively-closed belief set. Third, we show that the
scope of a revision can be restricted to just those propo-
sitions common to the knowledge base and sentence for
revision.
We begin by presenting a very general framework for
expressing belief change. This is restricted to address
revision and contraction. Following this, we show how
the approach allows for a uniform treatment of integrity
constraints. As well, the approach supports iterated
revision, with properties distinct from approaches based
on the work of Spohn (Spohn 1988). Finally we briefly
explore the general framework, and suggest it is flexible
enough to express extant approaches to revision and
update.
Background
A common approach in belief revision is to provide a
set of rationality postulates for revision and contrac-
tion functions. The AGM approach of Alchourron,
Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson (Ga¨rdenfors 1988), provides
the best-known set of such postulates. The goal is to
describe belief change on an abstract level, independent
of how beliefs are represented and manipulated. Belief
states, called belief sets, are modelled by sets of sen-
tences closed under the logical consequence operator of
some logic in some language L, where the logic includes
classical propositional logic. For belief set K, K + α is
the deductive closure of K ∪ {α}, and is called the ex-
pansion of K by α. K⊥ is the inconsistent belief set
(i.e. K⊥ = L). T is the set of all belief sets.
A revision function +˙ is a function from T × L to T
satisfying the following postulates.
(K+˙1) K+˙α is a belief set.
(K+˙2) α ∈ K+˙α.
(K+˙3) K+˙α ⊆ K + α.
(K+˙4) If ¬α 6∈ K, then K + α ⊆ K+˙α.
(K+˙5) K+˙α = K⊥ iff ⊢ ¬α.
(K+˙6) If ⊢ α ≡ β, then K+˙α = K+˙β.
(K+˙7) K+˙(α ∧ β) ⊆ (K+˙α) + β.
(K+˙8) If ¬β 6∈ K+˙α, then (K+˙α) + β ⊆ K+˙(α ∧ β).
That is: the result of revising K by α is a belief set in
which α is believed; whenever the result is consistent,
revision consists of the expansion of K by α; the only
time that K⊥ is obtained is when α is inconsistent;
and revision is independent of the syntactic form of K
and α. The last two postulates deal with the relation
between revising with a conjunction and expansion.
(Katsuno & Mendelzon 1992) explores the distinct
notion of belief update in which an agent changes its
beliefs in response to changes in its external environ-
ment. Our interests here centre on revision; however as
the end of the paper, we briefly consider this approach.
Recently there has been interest in iterated belief re-
vision, a topic that the AGM approach by-and-large
leaves open. Representative work includes (Boutilier
1994; Williams 1994; Lehmann 1995; Darwiche & Pearl
1997). We discuss Darwiche and Pearl’s approach here.
They employ the notion of an epistemic state that en-
codes how the revision function changes following a re-
vision. Ψ denotes an epistemic state; Bel(Ψ) denotes
the belief set corresponding to Ψ. So now the result
of revising an epistemic state is another epistemic state
(from which the revised belief set may be determined
using Bel(·). Darwiche and Pearl propose the following
postulates that “any rational system of belief change
should comply with” (p. 2). Following their practice,
we use Ψ to stand for Bel(Ψ) when it appears as an
argument of |=.
C1: If α |= µ then (Ψ+˙µ)+˙α ≡ Ψ+˙α.
C2: If α |= ¬µ then (Ψ+˙µ)+˙α ≡ Ψ+˙α.
C3: If Ψ+˙α |= µ then (Ψ+˙µ)+˙α |= µ.
C4: If Ψ+˙α 6|= ¬µ then (Ψ+˙µ)+˙α 6|= ¬µ.
(Nayak et al. 1996) propose a variant of C2 along with
the following postulate:
Conj: If α ∧ β 6|= ⊥ then (Ψ+˙α)+˙
α
β = Ψ+˙(α ∧ β).
where +˙
α
indicates that the change in +˙ following re-
vision by α depends in part on α. This postulate is
shown to be strong enough to derive C1, C3, and C4
in the presence of the other postulates.
There has also been work on specific approaches to
revision based on the distance between models of a
knowledge base and a sentence to be incorporated in
the knowledge base. This work includes (Dalal 1988;
Forbus 1989; Satoh 1988; Winslett 1988). In these ap-
proaches, models of the new knowledge base consist
of models of the sentence to be added that are clos-
est (based on “distance” between atomic sentences) to
models of the original knowledge base.
Our approach differs from previous work first, in that
we provide a specific, albeit general, framework in which
approaches may be expressed. As well, the general
framework allows the incorporation of different forms
of integrity constraints. Also, given that it falls into the
“consistency-based” paradigm, the approach has a cer-
tain syntactic flavour. However, notably, our approach
is independent of the syntactic form of the knowledge
base and sentence for revision.
Our technique of maximizing sets of equivalences of
propositional letters bears a superficial resemblance to
the use of such equivalences in (Liberatore & Schaerf
1997) (based in turn on the technique developed in (de
Kleer & Konolige 1989)). However the approaches are
distinct; in particular and in contradistinction to these
references, we employ disjoint alphabets for a knowl-
edge base and revising sentence. As well, the approach
bears a resemblance to that of (del Val 1993). However,
unlike del Val, we provide a single approach which may
be restricted to yield extant approaches; also, we place
no a priori restrictions on the form of a knowledge base.
Formal Preliminaries
We deal with propositional languages and use the log-
ical symbols ⊤, ⊥, ¬, ∨, ∧, ⊃, and ≡ to construct
formulas in the standard way. We write LP to de-
note a language over an alphabet P of propositional
letters or atomic propositions. Formulas are denoted
by the Greek letters α, β, α1, . . . . Knowledge bases
or, equivalently, belief sets are initially identified with
deductively-closed sets of formulas and are denoted K,
K1, . . . . So we have K = Cn(K), where Cn(·) is the
deductive closure of the formula or set of formulas given
as argument. Later we relax this restriction.
Given an alphabet P , we define a disjoint alphabet
P ′ as P ′ = {p′ | p ∈ P}. Then, for α ∈ LP , we define α′
as the result of replacing in α each proposition p from P
by the corresponding proposition p′ in P ′ (so implicitly
there is an isomorphism between P and P ′). This is
defined analogously for sets of formulas.
We define a belief change scenario in language LP
as a triple B = (K,U, V ), where K,U, V are sets of
formulas in LP . Informally, K is a knowledge base that
will be changed such that the set U will be true in the
result, and the set V will be consistent with the result.
For a base approach to revision we take V = ∅ and for
a base approach to contraction we take U = ∅.
In the definition below, “maximal” is with respect
to set containment (rather than set cardinality). The
following is our central definition.
Definition 1 Let B = (K,U, V ) be a belief change sce-
nario in LP . Define EQ as a maximal set of equiva-
lences EQ ⊆ {p ≡ p′ | p ∈ P} such that
K ′ ∪ EQ ∪ U ∪ V 6⊢ ⊥.
Then
Cn(K ′ ∪ EQ ∪ U) ∩ LP
is a consistent definitional extension of B.
Hence, a consistent definitional extension of B is a mod-
ification of K in which U is true, and in which V
is consistent. We say that EQ underlies the consis-
tent definitional extension of B. We let EQ stand for
{p ≡ p′ | p ∈ P} \ EQ.
Clearly, for a given belief change scenario there may
be more than one consistent definitional extension. We
will make use of the notion of a selection function c that
for any set I 6= ∅ has as value some element of I. In Defi-
nition 2 and 3, these primitive functions can be regarded
as inducing selection functions c′ on belief change sce-
narios, such that c′((K,U, V )) has as value some con-
sistent definitional extension of (K,U, V ). This is a
slight generalisation of selection functions as found in
the AGM approach.
Revision and Contraction
Definition 1 provides a very general framework for spec-
ifying belief change. In the next two definitions we give
specific definitions for revision and contraction. We de-
velop these specific approaches and then, at the end of
the paper, we return to the more general framework of
Definition 1 and discuss how it can be used to express
other approaches.
Definition 2 (Revision) Let K be a knowledge base
and α a formula, and let (Ei)i∈I be the family of all
consistent definitional extensions of (K, {α}, ∅). Then
1. K+˙cα = Ei is a choice revision of K by α with
respect to some selection function c with c(I) = i.
2. K+˙α =
⋂
i∈I Ei is the (skeptical) revision of K by
α.
Table 1 gives examples of (skeptical) revision. The
first column gives the original knowledge base, but with
atoms already renamed. The second column gives the
revision formula, while the third gives the EQ set(s)
and the last column gives the results of the revision.
For the first and last column, we give a formula whose
deductive closure gives the corresponding belief set.
K ′ α EQ K+˙α
p′ ∧ q′ ¬q {p ≡ p′} p ∧ ¬q
¬p′ ≡ q′ ¬q { p ≡ p′, q ≡ q′ } p ∧ ¬q
p′ ∨ q′ ¬p ∨ ¬q { p ≡ p′, q ≡ q′ } p ≡ ¬q
p′ ∧ q′ ¬p ∨ ¬q {p ≡ p′}, {q ≡ q′} p ≡ ¬q
Table 1: (Skeptical) revision examples.
In detail, for the last example, we wish to determine
{p ∧ q}+˙(¬p ∨ ¬q) . (1)
We find maximal sets EQ ⊆ {p ≡ p′, q ≡ q′} such that
{p′ ∧ q′} ∪ EQ ∪ {¬p ∨ ¬q} ∪ ∅ is consistent.
We get two such sets of equivalences, namely EQ1 =
{p ≡ p′} and EQ2 = {q ≡ q′}. Accordingly, we obtain
{p ∧ q}+˙(¬p ∨ ¬q) =⋂
i=1,2Cn({p
′ ∧ q′} ∪ EQi ∪ {¬p ∨ ¬q}) ∩ LP .
In addition to (¬p∨¬q), we get (p∨q), jointly implying
(p ≡ ¬q).
In this example we get two choice extensions,
Cn(p ∧ ¬q) and Cn(¬p ∧ q). This raises the question
of the usefulness of choice revision compared to general
revision. An apparent limitation of a choice reasoner is
that it might draw overly strong conclusions. However,
in belief revision this may be less of a problem than,
say, in nonmonotonic reasoning: the goal in revision is
to determine the true state of the world; if a (choice)
revision results in an inaccurate knowledge base, then
this inaccuracy will presumably be detected and recti-
fied in a later revision. So choice revision may do no
worse than a “skeptical” operator with respect to “con-
verging” to the true state of the world. In addition, as
we later show, it may do so significantly more efficiently
and with better worst-case behaviour. Hence for a land
vehicle exploring a benign environment, choice revision
might be an effective part of a control mechanism; for
something like flight control, or controlling a nuclear
reactor, one would prefer skeptical revision.
Contraction is defined similarly to revision.
Definition 3 (Contraction) Let K be a knowledge
base and α a formula, and let (Ei)i∈I be the family
of all consistent definitional extensions of (K, ∅, {¬α}).
Then
1. K−˙cα = Ei is a choice contraction of K by α with
respect to some selection function c with c(I) = i.
2. K−˙α =
⋂
i∈I Ei is the (skeptical) contraction of
K by α.
Table 2 gives examples of (skeptical) contraction, using
the same format and conventions as Table 1.
K ′ α EQ K−˙α
p′ ∧ q′ q {p ≡ p′} p
p′ ∧ q′ ∧ r′ p ∨ q {r ≡ r′} r
p′ ∨ q′ p ∧ q { p ≡ p′, q ≡ q′ } p ∨ q
p′ ∧ q′ p ∧ q {p ≡ p′}, {q ≡ q′} p ∨ q
Table 2: (Skeptical) contraction examples.
In detail, for the first example we wish to determine
{p ∧ q}−˙q . (2)
We compute the consistent definitional extensions of
({p∧q}, ∅, {¬q}). We rename the propositions in {p∧q}
and look for maximal subsets EQ of {p ≡ p′, q ≡ q′}
such that
{p′ ∧ q′} ∪EQ ∪ ∅ ∪ {¬q} is consistent.
We obtain EQ = {p ≡ p′}, yielding
{p ∧ q}−˙q = Cn({p′ ∧ q′} ∪ {p ≡ p′} ∪ ∅) ∩ LP
= Cn({p}).
Properties of Revision and Contraction
With respect to the AGM postulates, we obtain the
following.
Theorem 1 Let +˙ and +˙c be defined as in Definition 2.
Then +˙ and +˙c satisfy the basic AGM postulates (K+˙1)
to (K+˙4), (K+˙6) as well as (K+˙7).
For (K+˙5) we have instead the weaker postulate:
(K+˙5) K+˙α = K⊥ iff: K = K⊥ or ⊢ ¬α.
We obtain analogous results for −˙ and −˙c with re-
spect to the AGM contraction postulates:
Theorem 2 Let −˙ and −˙c be defined as in Definition 3.
Then −˙ satisfies the basic AGM postulates (K−˙1) to
(K−˙4), (K−˙6), and (K−˙7). In addition, −˙c satisfies
the basic AGM postulates (K−˙1) to (K−˙4), (K−˙6).
We also obtain the following interdefinability results:
Theorem 3 (Levi Identity) K+˙α = (K−˙¬α) + α.
Theorem 4 (Partial Harper Identity)
K−˙α ⊆ K ∩ (K+˙¬α)
The following example shows that equality fails in the
Harper Identity: ifK ≡ p∧q∧r and α ≡ r, thenK−˙α ≡
r while K ∩ (K+˙¬α) ≡ (p ≡ ¬q)∧ r. Similar results are
obtained for choice revision and choice contraction by
appeal to appropriate selection functions.
Iterated belief change: The approach obviously
supports iterated revision. Since we use a “global” met-
ric, and since we can assume that every revision result,
given K and α, can be determined, we continue to use
K here rather than Darwiche and Pearl’s Ψ for an epis-
temic state. That is, for us, we don’t need to refer to
epistemic states, since we have completely specified how
+˙ should behave on all arguments. Nonetheless, neither
operator in Definition 2 satisfies any of the Darwiche-
Pearl postulates for iterated revision. Nor in our opin-
ion should they. For example, for C1, if we have
K = Cn(¬p), α = p, µ = p ∨ q, (3)
then in our approach we obtain that
(K+˙µ)+˙α = Cn(p ∧ q) but K+˙α = Cn(p). (4)
(Darwiche & Pearl 1997; Nayak et al. 1996) assert that
these results should be equal. However, it is possible
(contra C1) that there are cases where revising ¬p by
p ∨ q yields ¬p ∧ q and a subsequent revision by p then
gives p∧q, but revising ¬p by p would yield p. Which is
to say, a significant difficulty in the area of belief revi-
sion is that different people have conflicting intuitions.
However, Darwiche and Pearl argue that all rational
revision functions should obey C1. Consequently they
would need to argue that in all cases, having (4) result
from (3) is irrational.
More seriously, an instance of C2 (letting α be ¬φ
and µ be φ ∧ ψ, whence α |= ¬µ) is the following:
C2′: (K+˙(φ ∧ ψ))+˙¬φ ≡ K+˙¬φ.
Thus if you revise by (φ∧ψ) and then revise by the nega-
tion of some of this information (¬φ), then the other
original information (ψ) is lost. So, in a variant of an
example from (Darwiche & Pearl 1997), consider where
I see a new bird in the distance and come to believe
that it is red and flies. If on closer examination I see
that it is yellow, then according to C2′ and so C2, I also
no longer believe that it flies. This seems too strong a
condition to want to adopt. We conjecture (but have
no proof) that approaches based on (Spohn 1988), such
as (Darwiche & Pearl 1997), are subject in some form
to such a “blanketing” result.
On the other hand, there are nontrivial results con-
cerning iterated revision that hold for the present ap-
proach. For example, we have:
Theorem 5 Let +˙ be defined as in Definition 2. Then:
(α+˙β)+˙α = β+˙α .
Semantics: The operator +˙ provides a (near) syn-
tactic counterpart to the minimal-distance-between-
models approach of (Satoh 1988). For two sets S and T ,
let S∆T be the symmetric difference, (S ∪T ) \ (S ∩T ).
For formulas α, β, define
∆min(α, β) =
min⊆({M∆M
′ |M ∈ Mod(α),M ′ ∈ Mod(β)}) ,
whereMod(α) is the set of all models of α, each of which
is identified with a set of propositions. Then, we have:
Theorem 6 Let B = (K,U, ∅) be a belief change sce-
nario in LP where K 6= LP , and let (EQi)i∈I be the
family of all sets of equivalences, as defined in Defini-
tion 1.
Then, { {p ∈ P | (p ≡ p′) 6∈ EQi} | i ∈ I} =
∆min(U,K).
This correspondence is interesting, but is of limited use
beyond supplying a semantics for one instance of the
approach. The choice approach, and (below) consider-
ations on implementation and integrity constraints, are
not readily expressed in Satoh’s model-based semantics.
As well, a contraction function is straightforwardly ob-
tained in Satoh’s approach only by using the Harper
Identity (which doesn’t fully obtain here). Further, in
the last section, we show how other approaches can be
expressed in our general framework.
Integrity Constraints
Definitions 2 and 3 are similar in form, differing only in
how the formula α is mapped onto the sets U and V in
Definition 1. Clearly one can combine these definitions,
allowing simultaneous revision by one formula and con-
traction by another. This in-and-of-itself isn’t overly
interesting, but it does lead to a natural and general
treatment of integrity constraints in our approach.
There are two standard definitions of a knowledge
base K satisfying a static integrity constraint IC. In
the consistency-based approach of (Kowalski 1978), K
satisfies IC iffK∪{IC} is satisfiable. In the entailment-
based approach of (Reiter 1984), K satisfies IC iff
K ⊢ IC. (Katsuno & Mendelzon 1991) show how
entailment-based constraints can be maintained across
revisions: given an integrity constraint IC and revision
function +˙, a revision function +˙
IC
which preserves
IC is defined by: K+˙
IC
α = K+˙(α ∧ IC). In our ap-
proach, we can define revision taking into account both
approaches to integrity constraints.
Corresponding to Definition 2 (and ignoring the
choice approach) we obtain:
Definition 4 Let K be a knowledge base, α a for-
mula, and ICK , ICR sets of formulas. Let (Ei)i∈I
be the family of all consistent definitional extensions of
(K, {α} ∪ ICR, ICK). Then K+˙
(ICK ,ICR)
α =
⋂
i∈I Ei
is the revision of K by α incorporating integrity con-
straints ICK (consistency-based) and ICR (entailment-
based).
Theorem 7 Let +˙
(ICK ,ICR) be defined as in Defini-
tion 4. Then
(
K+˙
(ICK ,ICR)
α
)
⊢ ICR. If ICR ∪
ICK 6⊢ ¬α then
(
K+˙
(ICK ,ICR)
α
)
∪ ICK is satisfiable.
Finally, and in contrast with previous approaches, it
is straightforward to add dynamic integrity constraints,
which express constraints that hold between states of
the knowledge base before and after revision. The sim-
plest way of so doing is to add such constraints to the
set V in Definition 1. To state that if a ∧ b is true in
a knowledge base before revision then c must be true
afterwards, we would add a′ ∧ b′ ⊃ c to V . Note how-
ever that the addition of dynamic constraints may lead
to an operator that violates some of the properties of
+˙. For example Cn(α)+˙¬α with dynamic constraint
α′ ⊃ α leads to an inconsistent revision.
Implementability Considerations
We claimed at the outset that the approach is well-
suited for implementation. To this end, we first consider
the use of choice belief revision. Second we consider the
problem of representing the results of revision in a finite,
manageable representation. Lastly, we address limiting
the range of EQ.
Complexity: From (Eiter & Gottlob 1992) and The-
orem 6 it follows that deciding, for given K, α, β,
whether K+˙α ⊢ β is ΠP2 -complete. However, the anal-
ogous problem for choice revision is lower in the poly-
nomial hierarchy.
Theorem 8 Given a selection function c, formulas
K,α, β, and a set of equivalnces EQ. Then, we have:
1. Deciding whether EQ determines a choice revision of
K and α is in PNP.
2. Deciding K+˙cα ⊢ β is in PNP.
We have not yet addressed restrictions on the syntactic
form of K or α; but see (Eiter & Gottlob 1992).
Finite representations: Definitions 1, 2, and 3 pro-
vide a characterisation of revision and contraction,
yielding in either case a deductively-closed belief set.
Here we consider how the same (with respect to log-
ical equivalence) operators can be defined, but where
a knowledge base is given as an arbitrary, finite set of
formulas. It follows from the discussion below that, for
knowledge baseK and formula α, we can defined choice
revision so that |K+˙cα| ≤ |K| + |α| for any selection
function c.
Informally the procedure is straightforward, although
the technical details are less so. A knowledge base K is
now represented by a formula (or set of formulas). Via
Definitions 1 and 2 we consider maximal sets EQ where
{K ′} ∪ {α} ∪ EQ is consistent. For each such set EQ,
we replace each p′ in K ′ by p where (p ≡ p′) ∈ EQ and
we replace each p′ in K ′ by ¬p where (p ≡ p′) ∈ EQ.
The result of these substitutions into {K ′} ∪ {α} is a
sentence of size ≤ |K|+ |α| and whose deductive closure
is equivalent to (some) choice revision. The disjunction
of all such sentences (and so considering all possible sets
EQ) is equivalent to Cn(K)+˙α.
As opposed to the computation of the sets EQ, the
result of revising or contracting a formulaK can be cap-
tured without an explicit change of alphabet. We start
by observing that any set of equivalences EQ induces a
binary partition of its underlying alphabet P , namely
〈PEQ,PEQ〉 with PEQ = {p ∈ P | p ≡ p
′ ∈ EQ}
and P
EQ
= P \ PEQ. Given a belief change scenario
B along with a set of equivalences EQi (according to
Definition 1), we define for α ∈ LP , that ⌈α⌉i is the
result of replacing in α each proposition p ∈ P
EQi
by
its negation ¬p.
For generality, let K be a set of formulas:
Definition 5 Let B = (K,U, V ) be a belief change sce-
nario in LP and let (EQi)i∈I be the family of all sets
of equivalences, as defined in Definition 1.
Define ⌈B⌉ as
∨
i∈I
∧
(s∈K)⌈s⌉i and ⌈B⌉
c as∧
(s∈K)⌈s⌉k for selection function c corresponding to
EQk.
For revision, we define ⌈(K, {α}, ∅)⌉∧α as the finite rep-
resentation of K+˙α, and analogously ⌈(K, {α}, ∅)⌉c∧α
as the finite representation of K+˙cα.
Theorem 9 Let K and α be formulas. Then, we have
Cn(K)+˙α = Cn( ⌈(Cn(K), {α}, ∅)⌉ ∧ α)
≡ ⌈(K, {α}, ∅)⌉ ∧ α.
Consider example (1): {p ∧ q}+˙(¬p ∨ ¬q). So B =
({p ∧ q}, {(¬p ∨ ¬q)}, ∅) is the belief change scenario.
We obtain:
⌈B⌉ ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬q) = [(p ∧ ¬q) ∨ (¬p ∧ q)] ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬q),
which is equivalent to (p ≡ ¬q). For the other examples
in Table 1, if K is the formula corresponding to K ′
in the first column, then revising by the given α via
Theorem 9 is the formula given in the last line (up to
permutation of symbols and elimination of definitional
equivalents).
Contraction is handled somewhat differently. This
is not altogether surprising, given that revision and
contraction are not fully interdefinable (Theorem 4).
Whereas for revision we replaced each atomic propo-
sition in EQi by its negation in K, for contraction
replacements in K are done over all truth values of
atomic propositions in EQi. Formally, given a be-
lief change scenario B, a corresponding set of equiv-
alences EQi (according to Definition 1) along with
its induced partition 〈PEQi ,PEQi〉 of P , and a func-
tion piki : PEQi → {⊤,⊥}, we define for α ∈ LP ,
⌊α⌋ki as the result of replacing in α each proposition
p ∈ P
EQi
by piki(p). Note that each set of equiva-
lences induces a whole set Πi of such mappings piki ,
viz. Πi = {piki | piki : PEQi → {⊤,⊥}}, amounting to
all possible truth assignments to P
EQi
.
Definition 6 Let B and (EQi)i∈I be defined as in Def-
inition 5.
Define ⌊B⌋ as
∨
i∈I,pij∈Πi
∧
(s∈K)⌊s⌋
j and ⌊B⌋c as∨
pij∈Πk
∧
(s∈K)⌊s⌋
j for some selection function c with
c(I) = k.
We define ⌊(K, ∅, {¬α})⌋ as the finite representation of
K−˙α, and analogously ⌊(K, ∅, {¬α})⌋c as the finite rep-
resentation of K−˙cα.
Theorem 10 Let K and α be formulas. Then, we have
Cn(K)−˙α = Cn( ⌊(Cn(K), ∅, {¬α})⌋ )
≡ ⌊(K, ∅, {¬α})⌋ .
Consider example (2): {p ∧ ¬q}−˙(¬q). We obtain
⌊ ({p ∧ ¬q}, ∅, {q}) ⌋ = (p ∧ ⊥) ∨ (p ∧ ⊤) ≡ p .
For the examples in Table 2, if K is the formula corre-
sponding to K ′, then in contracting by the given α, the
result of the contraction via Theorem 10 is the formula
given in the last line (up to permutation of symbols and
elimination of definitional equivalents).
Theorems 9 and 10 are interesting in that they show
that revision and contraction can be defined with re-
spect to syntactic objects (viz. sentences representing
the knowledge base) yet are essentially independent of
syntactic form. Hence in a certain sense the approach
combines the advantages of base revision (Nebel 1992)
and syntax-independent approaches.
Limiting the range of EQ: Intuitively, if an atomic
sentence appears in a knowledge base K but not in a
sentence for revision α, or vice versa, then that atomic
sentence plays no part in the revision. This is indeed
the case here, as the next result demonstrates. Let
Vocab(δ) be the atomic sentences in δ. We obtain:
Theorem 11 Let K be a set of formulas and α a for-
mula. Let E = Cn(K ′ ∪ EQ ∪ α) ∩ LP be a con-
sistent definitional extension of belief change scenario
B = (Cn(K), {α}, ∅).
Then {p ≡ p′ | p ∈ (Vocab(K ) \ Vocab(α)) ∪
(Vocab(α) \Vocab(K ))} ⊆ EQ .
So for belief change, we need consider just the atomic
sentences common to K and α, and can ignore (with
regards EQ) other atomic sentences. As detailed in the
full paper, this result allows one to limit the primed
atomic propositions in K ′ to those occurring in α.
The General Approach
Definition 1 is quite general; in Definitions 2 and 3 we
narrow the scope to specific approaches to belief change.
We note however, briefly, that other approaches are ex-
pressible in this framework. Belief update is a distinct
form of belief change, suited to a changing world. Up-
date and its dual operator erasure are studied in (Kat-
suno & Mendelzon 1992) where sets of postulates char-
acterising the operators are given.
Definition 7 (Prime Implicate) A consistent set of
literals l is a prime implicate1 of K iff: l ⊢ K and for
l′ ⊂ l we have l′ 6⊢ K.
Definition 8 (Update) Let K be a knowledge base
and α a formula and let PI(K) be the set of prime
implicates of K. For each Kj ∈ PI(K), 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
let Ej1 , . . . , E
j
nj
be the consistent definitional extensions
of (Kj , {α}, ∅). Then K ⋄ α =
⋃m
j=1
⋂nj
i=1E
j
i is the
update of K by α.
We do not define choice update here, given space limi-
tations.
Theorem 12 K ⋄ α satisfies the update postulates of
(Katsuno & Mendelzon 1992).
We show in the full paper that the operator ⋄ provides
a syntactic counterpart for Winslett’s update operator
(Winslett 1988). We can also take a different notion
of maximal in Definition 1, and base the definition on
set cardinality, rather than set containment. We show
that based on this measure we can capture the revision
approaches of (Dalal 1988) and (Forbus 1989). Lastly a
minor modification to Definition 1 allows one to use the
framework to capture the merging of knowledge bases.
Conclusion
We have presented a general consistency-based frame-
work for belief change, having the same flavour as the
1Note that this is the dual of prime implicant.
consistency-based paradigms for diagnosis or default
reasoning. We focus on a specific approach, in which a
knowledge base K and sentence α are expressed, via re-
naming propositions inK, in separate alphabets. Given
this, we assume that as many corresponding atoms in
each language are equivalent insofar as is consistently
possible. Lastly, we express the resultant knowledge
base in a single language. For the revision of K by α,
for example, we begin with α and incorporate as much
of K as consistently possible. This gives rise to two
notions of revision: a choice notion, in which one such
“extension” is used for the revised state, and the inter-
section of all such extensions.
The approach is well-suited for implementation: The
notion of a choice extension gives better complexity re-
sults than general revision; also, belief revision is an
area in which choice reasoning may be useful. Second,
we show how the approach can be expressed in terms of
a finite knowledge base, and that the scope of a revision
can be restricted to those propositions common to the
knowledge base and sentence for revision.
The approach allows for a uniform treatment of in-
tegrity constraints, in that belief change may take into
account both consistency-based and entailment-based
static constraints, as well as dynamic constraints. As
well, it supports iterated revision. Finally, the frame-
work is applicable to other approaches to belief change.
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